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Mediators are often thought to be more effective if they are unbiased or have no preferences over the issue in dispute. This
article presents a game theoretic model of mediation drawing on the theory of “cheap talk” which highlights a contrary
logic. Conﬂict arises in bargaining games because of uncertainty about the resolve of the parties. A mediator can reduce
the likelihood of conﬂict by providing information on this score. For a mediator to be effective, however, the parties must
believe that the mediator is telling the truth, especially if the mediator counsels one side to make a concession because their
opponent has high resolve and will ﬁght. An unbiased mediator who is simply interested in minimizing the probability of
conﬂict will have a strong incentive to make such statements even if they are not true, hence the parties will not ﬁnd the
mediator credible. Only mediators who are effectively “on your side” will be believed if they counsel restraint.
C
onsider two cases of international mediation,
one failure and one success. In 1982 af-
ter Argentina invaded the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands, the United States attempted to mediate be-
tweenBritainandArgentina.SecretaryofState Alexander
Haig attempted to persuade the Argentine Generals to
withdraw:
In one ﬁnal attempt to convince them, I sent Dick
Walters to see Galtieri alone and tell him in crystal
clear terms, in the Spanish language, that if there
was no negotiated settlement, the British would
ﬁght and that the United States would support
Britain.Galtierilistenedandreplied:“Whyareyou
tellingmethis?TheBritishwon’tﬁght.”(Haig1984,
280)
As it turned out, Haig’s statements to Argentina were
truthful, yet the mediation effort failed.
In early 1999, the conflict between the Serbian gov-
ernment and the Kosovo Albanians spun out of control.
In April, Serbia rejected a deal brokered at Rambouillet,
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France by NATO. Serbian forces swept into Kosovo and
beganawholesaleefforttodisplacetheAlbanianpopula-
tion, and NATO began a bombing campaign that grew in
intensity for three months. In June, Russian envoy Victor
ChernomyrdinwenttoBelgradefortalkswithMilosevic.
The Russian Foreign Minister recalled, “By late May we
had reliable information that preparation for a ground
invasion was in full swing” while another Russian source
commented, “We told Milosevic that he needed to take
a ground attack seriously.”1 Milosevic accepted the latest
NATO proposals and the mediation was a success.
Thesetwomediationattemptsweresimilarinthatthe
mediator attempted to persuade one side to make a con-
cessionbecausetheothersidewouldfightifnoconcession
wasforthcoming.Thiskindof advice,if itisbelieved,can
be crucial in resolving conflicts. In bargaining situations,
conflict is often avoidable if the parties have complete
information but may erupt if there is uncertainty about
resolve or other factors (Fearon 1995; Powell 2002). For
instance, Argentina presumably would not have started
thecrisisifitknewthattheBritishwouldfightratherthan
acquiesceinamilitarytakeoveroftheislands.Argentina’s
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uncertaintyaboutBritishresolveledittotakeachanceon
invading.HaigattemptedtoprovideArgentinawithinfor-
mationaboutBritishresolve,toreduceitsuncertainty,but
hewasunpersuasiveandconflictensued.Chernomyrdin’s
analogous communication was more successful.
Why did Chernomyrdin succeed where Haig failed?
The answer has to do with the mediator’s motivations
and corresponding incentives to tell the truth. A medi-
ator who is biased in favor of one’s opponent will have
a strong incentive to claim that the opponent has high
resolve whether or not this is true and will therefore not
be believed. Haig acknowledged that his “sympathy was
with the British,” though he attempted to act impartially
out of a belief that neutral mediators are more effec-
tive (Haig 1984, 266). However, if Haig preferred a solu-
tion involving an Argentine withdrawal from the islands,
andbelievedthatArgentinawouldwithdrawif itthought
Britain would fight, he would have every incentive to tell
Argentina that Britain would fight, even if he thought
Britain was unlikely to do so. Thus a mediator who is bi-
ased against you will have no credibility on the subject of
the other side’s resolve.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the same logic applies in
the case of a mediator who is unbiased or has no policy
preferences at all over the issue in dispute. An unbiased
mediatorwhoissimplyinterestedinminimizingtheprob-
ability of war will also have a strong incentive to tell each
sidethattheiropponenthashighresolveandwillfightun-
less they receive a concession. If the mediator is believed,
eachsidewillmakeaconcession,increasingthelikelihood
of a peaceful settlement. Since this is what the mediator
wants, the mediator has an incentive to make such state-
mentsevenif theyarenottrue.Hencethepartieswillnot
find such statements credible.
Only a mediator who is effectively “on your side”
will be believed if she counsels restraint. A mediator who
shares your policy preferences to some extent could be
trusted to tell you if she thought the adversary had low
resolve and was likely to back down even without a con-
cession.Shecouldthereforebetrustedifshecounseledthe
reverse, that the adversary has high resolve and will fight.
ThisisthecentralreasonbehindChernomyrdin’ssuccess.
RussianpreferenceswereknowntobealignedwithSerbia
andthereforeRussiawasacrediblemediator.IfRussiasaid
NATO would invade, Serbia could believe it.2
In this article I develop these arguments with a game
theoretic model of mediation. The article has three sec-
tions. First, I place mediation in the context of what
economistscall“cheaptalk,”orcostlessbutstrategiccom-
2For a conterargument that Russian preferences were no longer
aligned with Milosevic and that the threat of an invasion was not
important, see Stigler (2002/03).
munication.Second,Ipresentaformalmodelofbargain-
ing and mediation that shows when mediators are credi-
ble. Finally, I draw out the empirical implications of the
model.Anappendixfollowswithmathematicaldetailsof
the model.
Mediation and Cheap Talk
Mediationisoftenseenasoneoftheprimarytoolsofcon-
flict resolution, in both civil and international conflicts.
Given the importance of mediation, it is not surprising
that there is a large academic literature on the subject
(forreviews,seeWall1981;WallandLynn1993;Kleiboer
1996; Wall, Stark, and Standifer 2001; for collections of
essays, Touval and Zartman 1985; Mitchell and Webb
1988;KresselandPruitt1989;BercovitchandRubin1992;
Vasquez et al. 1995; Bercovitch 1996; Crocker, Hampson,
andAall1999).Despiteanextensiveliteratureonthesub-
ject, however, the theory of how mediation works is not
welldeveloped.Manyunresolvedquestionsremainabout
what makes for successful mediation. One of the most
salient of these debates is about the impact of the medi-
ator’s motivations on the mediation process. Mediators
areoftenthoughttobemoreeffectiveiftheyareunbiased
or impartial (Fisher 1995). Young argues that, “the exis-
tence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend
on the party’s being perceived as an impartial participant
(in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding ei-
therprotagonist)...”(Young1967,81).Manypractition-
e r sa g r e e ,i nH a i g ’sv i e w ,“the honest broker must, above
all, be neutral” (Haig, 1984, 266).
Some scholars, however, have questioned the impor-
tance of mediator impartiality (Touval 1982; Bercovitch
and Houston 1996, 26; Carnevale and Arad 1996;
Zartman and Touval 1996). Touval and Zartman argue
that “mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms be-
ingnegotiated.Evenwhentheyseekpeaceintheabstract,
they try to avoid terms not in accord with their own in-
terests” (Touval and Zartman 1989, 118). They see me-
diation as an exercise in power politics: “leverage is the
ticket to mediation” (Touval and Zartman 1989, 129).
Mediators apply leverage to one side and or the other
to extract concessions. Bias does not prevent mediators
from being successful, “impartiality is neither an indis-
pensible condition of their acceptability, nor a necessary
condition for the successful performance of an interme-
diary’s functions” (Touval 1975, 56). The divergence be-
tween this conception of mediation and the more tradi-
tional image of a neutral facilitator has led some scholars
to posit two different categories of mediator. Princen, for
instance,distinguishesthe“neutral”mediatorwhoisboth
weak and impartial from the “principal” mediator whoWHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 599
is powerful and interested or biased (1992, 18).3 While
impartiality is appropriate for the weak mediator, bias is
seen as acceptable, perhaps inevitable, for the powerful
mediator.
Thisdebatewithinthemediationliteratureisechoed
in the literature on international institutions as well. Re-
alist perspectives on mediation tend to view it as either
epiphenomenal or as an opportunity for powerful and
interested third parties to impose settlements to their lik-
ing in regional conflicts via a combination of carrots and
sticks(Gelpi1999,117).Realists(and,inthecontextofthe
EuropeanUnion,liberalintergovernmentalists)maintain
thatinformationprovidingmediatorsshouldhavenoim-
pactondisputeresolution,whethertheyarebiasedorim-
partial (Moravcsik 1999, 278–9). In contrast, institution-
alists maintain that international institutions can exert
influencebyprovidinginformation,eveniftheyarepow-
erless in a traditional sense (Keohane 1984; Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Neutral mediators are often
thought to act in just this way, providing information
that facilitates conflict resolution. These debates remain
unresolved in part because of a lack of a firm theoretical
understanding of the various roles that mediators play in
the bargaining process. This problem can best be reme-
died by incorporating mediators directly into bargaining
models of conflict.4
HereIfocusononeoftheseroles,theprovisionofin-
formationabouttheresolveofthenegotiatingparties,and
arguethatcertainaspectsof thisrolecanbethoughtof as
aninstanceofwhateconomistscallcheaptalk.Cheaptalk
is communication in strategic contexts that does not af-
fectthepayoffsdirectly,butmayaffectthemindirectlyifit
conveys information that can cause the players to modify
theirbehavior.5Cheaptalkisoftencontrastedwith“costly
signals,” gestures which have a direct impact on payoffs,
andderivetheircredibilityfromthislink.Theclassicillus-
trationof acostlysignalininternationalrelationsiswhen
one party in a dispute mobilizes military forces during
a crisis to demonstrate resolve; by increasing the risk of
war the mobilization demonstrates a willingness to fight.
An example of cheap talk in this case would be one party
simply telling the other that it will fight unless the other
side makes a concession. In itself, the communication is
3See Smith (1985) for a similar distinction between “traditional”
and “international” mediation and Touval (1985) for a response.
4Foranotherrecentgametheoreticanalysisofmediation,seeMaoz
and Tellis (2002).
5For a good introduction see Farrell and Rabin (1996); for the
origins of the literature, see Crawford and Sobel (1982); for re-
finements and developments, see Farrell and Gibbons (1989a),
Rabin(1990),Matthews,Okuno-Fujiwara,andPostlewaite(1991),
Farrell (1993), Blume and Sobel (1995), and Austen-Smith and
Banks (2000).
not costly, but if it changes the other side’s beliefs about
the first party’s resolve, it could affect the outcome of the
negotiation.
Cheap-talkmodelstypicallyfocusona“sender”with
privateinformationwhocancommunicatetoa“receiver”
who then takes an action that affects the payoffs of both
parties. The central result of such models is that success-
ful communication requires a certain amount of com-
mon interest, or at least lack of a conflict of interest. This
means that cheap talk is usually quite effective in coor-
dination games (Morrow 1994). If two people are trying
to coordinate on a meeting place, there is no point in
the sender misleading the receiver about where she will
be. Truth-telling equilibria can be supported even if the
sender is completely indifferent to what action the re-
ceiver takes. If a stranger asks the time of day, there is
no positive reason to mislead her, so truth telling is an
equilibrium.
In bargaining situations, where the interests of the
partiesaremoredirectlyopposed,cheaptalkismoreprob-
lematic because of a credibility problem. In the interna-
tionalrelationscontext,stateshaveanincentivetosaythey
are“tough”orhavelowcostsforfighting,becausethiswill
persuadetheothersideinacrisistobackdownorconcede
the issue at stake. This incentive holds as much for states
which are actually unwilling to fight as it does for those
willing to fight, thus there is an incentive to bluff, or mis-
represent one’s true costs for fighting. One party cannot
credibly just tell another that it has high resolve and will
fight if it does not receive a concession, since they face an
incentive to say this even if it is not true (Fearon 1995).6
If we consider mediation as a form of cheap talk,
the first thing that becomes apparent is that we can-
not use a mediator to solve the credibility problem that
plagues cheap talk in bargaining directly. If the media-
tor is known to be credible to the other party, and the
mediator will believe what she is told, then each party
has every incentive to tell the mediator that it has high
resolve and will fight unless it receives a concession, re-
gardless of whether this is true. The mediator will then
convey this to the other side; the other side will then
believe that it faces a high-resolve type and will make
a concession. Thus if there is an incentive to bluff to the
other side, there will be an incentive to bluff to the medi-
ator, and the mediator will have to discount statements
about resolve. Interjecting a mediator, therefore, does
6An exception to this logic is analyzed by Farrell and Gibbons
(1989b). While this model somewhat artificially generates a break-
down in bargaining if one or both sides claim to be tough, it is
suggestive of how cheap talk might matter if there are opportunity
costs of negotiation.600 ANDREW KYDD
not solve the bluffing problem that plagues cheap talk in
bargaining.7
This problem highlights two questions that any the-
ory of mediation as information provision must answer.
First, how does the mediator get the information that
she is to provide? Second, when can the mediator credi-
blycommunicatethisinformationtothenegotiatingpar-
ties? I do not focus on the first question here, except to
note that there are many sources of information about
the resolve of a state other than that state’s communi-
cations. Once a mediator gets involved in a negotiation,
she typically spends considerable effort learning about
the dispute and the parties involved, researching the is-
sue, talking to third parties, etc. Some state mediators,
such as the United States or Russia, have intelligence ca-
pabilities that enable them to form their own estimates
from clandestine sources. Suffice it to say that third par-
ties usually exist who have information or opinions to
contribute that could alter the parties’ beliefs if they were
credible.
Assuming the mediator has information to provide,
when can they credibly provide it? Intuition might sug-
gest that only an unbiased mediator could credibly pro-
vide such information because only an impartial source
could be trusted. The theory of cheap talk suggests that
the sender’s interests must be either aligned with the re-
ceiver’s,orthesendermustbeindifferenttothereceiver’s
interestsforatruth-tellingequilibriumtobesustained.In
themediationcontext,thepartiesinterestsareopposedso
the mediator clearly cannot be aligned with both of them
at once.8 However if the mediator were completely indif-
ferent to the issue in dispute, the mediator would seem
to be credible to both sides. This would seem to justify
the focus on impartiality in the mediation literature; an
impartial mediator can be trusted by both sides because
she has no interest in favoring or harming either side. In
fact, as outlined in the introduction, this intuiton does
7A related strand in economics is the mechanism design literature
(Myerson1979,1991;BanksandCalvert1992).Thesemodelsposit
twoactorswithprivateinformationwhosendmessagestoacentral
“mediator”whichprocessesthemessagesandissuesinstructionsto
theplayersthatformanequilibrium.Afundamentalproblemwith
thisliterature,inaninternationalrelationscontext,isthatthemedi-
ator here is really an automaton, not an actor with preferences and
beliefs (for an exception, see Baliga, Corchon, and Sj¨ ostr¨ om 1997).
In particular, in order to encourage honest revelation of private
information,themediatormustdeliberatelyinduceacertainprob-
ability of conflict after receiving information sufficient to prevent
this. This is not credible for a mediator in international relations
whoisastrategicactorwhowishes,amongotherthings,toprevent
conflict.
8An interesting exception would be if there are multiple issues and
themediatorisalignedwithpartyAonissue1andwithpartyBon
issue 2.
not turn out to be correct. To see why, it is necessary to
consider the problem formally.
The Model
Beforelayingoutthemodel,Iwilldiscussthescopeofthe
analysis and define a key term, mediator bias.
The Scope of the Model
The model applies to situations with the following char-
acteristics. First, the parties to the dispute are engaged in
a negotiation such that if they reach an agreement they
expecttosufferlowercostsfromconflictthantheyexpect
iftheyfailtoreachanagreement.Thelowerexpectedlevel
of conflict with an agreement results from the fact that at
least one issue dividing the parties, the subject of the ne-
gotiations,hasbeenatleasttemporarilysettled.Thismay
notreducethelevelofviolencerightaway,buttheparties,
and mediator, must believe that the agreement will help
reducetheviolenceeventually,orbringittoanendsooner.
Themodelmakesnospecificassumptionsaboutwhether
thetwosidesarecurrentlyatpeaceandattemptingtopre-
vent a war or are negotiating the end of an ongoing con-
flict. The conflict resulting from bargaining failure may
range from all-out war to low-intensity conflict, guerrilla
activity, or terrorist strikes. An agreement may not lead
to absolute and permanent peace; it could simply mean a
temporary reduction in the level or intensity of conflict.
Theassumptionbehindthemodelissimplythatbargain-
ing success leads to a reduction in the expected level of
mutual costs from fighting in comparison to what would
have happened if the bargaining had failed.9
Imaketwoassumptionsaboutthemediator’spr efer -
ences. First, I assume that the mediator prefers that there
beanagreementratherthanthatthebargainingfail.More
precisely, the mediator suffers a cost if the bargaining
breaksdown,sothatwhateverherotherpreferences,there
areatleastsomeagreementsthatthemediatorwouldpre-
fertoseemaderatherthanhavethenegotiationscollapse.
All this assumption rules out is mediators who engage in
mediation in order to prevent a resolution to the conflict
because they gain some positive benefit from prolonging
it. Second, I assume that mediators may or may not have
9Forsimplicity,themodelfocusesonasingleissuewhichifresolved
produces peace and if not resolved leads to conflict. However, pa-
rameters could easily be added representing the payoffs from con-
flicts over other unresolved issues without altering the results, so
long as settling the issue at hand does not make settling the others
harder, and hence increase the costs of conflict related to the other
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some other interests which lead them to have preferences
overthedifferentpossibleissueresolutionstothedispute.
These preferences may be weak or strong, directly or in-
directly related to the issues in dispute, and may cause
the mediator to favor the interests of one party or the
other. For instance, if Kissinger preferred to have Egypt
gettheSinaibackafterthe1973war,itwasnotbecausethe
UnitedStatescaredaboutwhoownedtheSinaiperse,but
because he felt it would enable the United States to cul-
tivate Egypt as a regional ally and erode Soviet influence
in the Middle East (Quandt 1993, 186, 230). Thus the as-
sumptions about mediator motivations are fairly broad,
they have some desire to see negotiations succeed, and
they may have some other preferences over the outcomes
or possible deals.
Mediator bias is defined in terms of the preferences
of the mediator. If the mediator’s preferences are aligned
with one party or the other, she is said to be biased in fa-
vorofthatparty.Moreprecisely,foranytwopossibleissue
resolutionsAandB overwhichtheplayershaveaconflict
of interest such that player 1 prefers A to B and player 2
hasthereversepreferences,if themediatorprefersAto B,
I say the mediator is biased in favor of player 1, and if the
mediatorhasthereversepreferences,sheisbiasedinfavor
of player 2. If the mediator is indifferent between A and
B, then she is defined to be unbiased or neutral. This def-
initionof mediatorbiasfollowsfromYoung’sconception
of impartiality.
The most restrictive aspect of the model is that it fo-
cusesononlyoneofthemanyrolesofmediators:thepro-
vision of information about the resolve of the parties in
an attempt to extract concessions. Flesh and blood medi-
atorsdomanyotherthings;theymakeproposals,manip-
ulate the agenda, cajole and flatter, and, if they represent
powerful countries, offer carrots and threaten sticks in
order to move the parties to agreement.10 I am certainly
not arguing that the role I focus on is more important
than the other roles or that the other roles are not worthy
of much study. I focus on information provision about
resolve for two reasons. First, I argue that most media-
tors, at some point in their mediation experience, in the
midst of all their other tasks and strategies, do attempt to
extractconcessionsfromthenegotiatingpartiesbywarn-
ing them that without a concession the negotiations will
fail and conflict will continue (or begin). Hence it is well
worthknowingwhenthiskindoftacticwillbesuccessful.
Second, we have a set of theoretical tools which are well
adaptedtoshedlightonthisquestion:modelswhichhave
developedintheliteratureoncrisisbargainingandcheap
10See Bercovitch and Houston (2000) for a discussion of the range
of mediator strategies.
talk.Sowhilethemodeldoessingleoutonetacticamong
many that mediators employ, I argue that that tactic is an
important one which is used in most mediation efforts
and merits careful study.11
The Structure of the Model
Often in international bargaining contexts one side is
“satisfied” while the other is potentially “dissatisfied,”
where satisfied means prefering the status quo to con-
flict,anddissatisfiedmeanspreferingconflicttothestatus
quo (Powell 1999, 88). Once the Argentines had executed
their fait acompli and taken the islands, Argentina was
satisfiedbecauseitwouldprefertokeeptheislandsrather
thanfightfurther.Britainwaspotentiallydissatisfied,be-
cause it might have prefered to fight rather than live with
the new status quo (as it turned out, Britain was dissat-
isfied and did fight). The key strategic problem is for the
satisfied power to judge how likely the potentially dissat-
isfied power is to really be dissatisfied. To reduce the risk
of conflict, the satisfied power may wish to make some
concession to the other side, hoping to buy them off. The
danger is that the concession will not be big enough and
that the other side will decide to attack (or keep fighting
if the war is already in progress) rather than accept it or
live with the status quo.
The model captures this strategic dilemma by posit-
ing two players, 1 and 2, where player 1 is satisfied and
player 2 is potentially dissatisfied. Player 1 is not sure if
player 2 is dissatisfied or not and may make a concession
in an effort to buy him off. The sequence of events is as
follows. First, Nature determines player 2’s type and the
informationthatthemediatorhasaboutplayer2’slevelof
resolve. Next, the mediator can communicate with player
1 about player 2’s level of resolve. Finally, player 1 and
player 2 bargain together.12
The bargaining game is illustrated in Figure 1. Two
players are bargaining over a pie represented by the unit
interval.Player1proposesadivisionx.Player2canaccept
the proposal or reject it and fight. If player 2 accepts the
proposal, player 1 gets x and player 2 gets y = 1 − x.I f
11It may be argued that isolating one tactic for study may distort
our understanding by obscuring how the different tactics interact.
While this may be true, I think an adequate understanding of the
whole must be built up from a careful study of the parts, first
taken in isolation, and then carefully combined to examine their
interactions.
12Structured in this way, the model may seem to depict an advisor
ratherthanamediator.However,mediatorsoftenactlikeadvisorsin
thissense;mediatorsfrequentlyadvisethenegotiatingparties,based
on their sense of the other party’s resolve, to make a concession to
increase the chances of concluding an agreement.602 ANDREW KYDD
FIGURE1 TheBargainingGame
TABLE 1 Notation in the Model
x,( y) Player 1’s( 2 ’s) payoff from a deal
p Player 1’s chance of winning in a conflict
ci Player i’s cost of conflict
  The mediator’sd e g r e eo fb i a s
k The upper bound on player 2’s costs of fighting
(c2 ∈ [0, k])
s The status quo division of the issue
  The likelihood the mediator’s information is
in error
h The likelihood player 2 has high costs (c2 > s − p)
A, B The boundaries of k between which player 1’so f f e r
depends on k
player 2 decides to fight, player 1’s conflict payoff is p −
c1, while player 2 receives 1 − p − c2,w h e r ep is player
1’s chance of winning the conflict and ci is player i’s cost
of fighting. The mediator also has a preference function
overtheissuespace x andpaysacostif thereisaconflict
cm. The mediator’s payoff for conflict is therefore  p −
cm.I f  > 0 the mediator is said to be biased in favor of
player 1 because she prefers issue resolutions to the right
(biggervaluesofx)asdoesplayer1.If <0,themediator
is biased in favor of player 2, and if   = 0, the mediator is
unbiased.Noteif themediatorisunbiased,herpayoff for
any accepted offer is 0 and her payoff for conflict is −cm,
sothemediatorisindifferentoverthepossiblesettlements
and just wants to secure a deal.13 Notation in the game is
summarized in Table 1.
13Calvert (1985) and Myers (1998) present models demonstrating
the usefulness of biased advice but their conception of bias is dif-
ferent from the above so their results speak to different issues. In
the Calvert set-up, the advisors are not strategic actors with prefer-
ences,asthemediatorishere,butsimplyproviderecommendations
ofacourseofactioninaccordancewithcertainprobabilities,which
may be biased toward one of the possible choices. Hence the cred-
ibility of the advisor—his willingness to tell the truth—is not at
stake; rather the question is what kind of advice could be useful to
Beliefs
The uncertainty in the model is over player 2’sc o s tf o r
fighting, or resolve. Nature starts the game by choosing
player 2’s cost from a uniform distribution c2 ∈ [0, k].
Thus player 2’s reservation value in the bargining game,
or the minimum offer it will accept rather than fight,
ranges from p to p + k as illustrated in Figure 2. The
horizontal lines represent the bargaining space, x, rang-
ing between zero and 1. Player 1 prefers issue resolutions
to the right; player 2 prefers deals to the left. Player 1’s
likelihood of winning a conflict, p, is less than the status
quo, s, hence player 1 prefers the status quo to conflict
or is satisfied, while player 2 may not be, depending on
player 2’s cost of fighting. Types of player 2 with c2 ∈ [0,
s − p) are dissatisfied or have “low” costs for fighting,
types with c2 ∈ [s − p, k] are satisfied or have “high”
costsforfighting.Theheightofthebarsreflectstheprob-
ability density for each type, or the likelihood of facing a
type with the corresponding cost for fighting. In the top
of the figure, the prior beliefs are illustrated, the uniform
distribution previously mentioned. The prior belief that
player 2 has high costs (the area under the right bar) is
denoted h.
To model the mediator’s additional information, af-
terNaturechoosesplayer2’stypewehavehersendasignal
to the mediator about this fact. That is, Nature can send
the mediator a signal saying, “Player 2 has high costs,”
or H for short, or she can tell player 1, “Player 2 has low
costs,”orL.Thesemessagesmaynotbecorrect,however.
I do not assume that the mediator is perfectly informed
about player 2’s type, merely that the mediator has some
additional information that might be useful to player 1.
The likelihood that a message is in error is  , and the cor-
respondinglikelihoodthatthemessageisaccurateis1− 
where 1 −   >  . These messages reflect any information
that the mediator has been able to gather about player 2’s
resolve.
The mediator’s subsequent beliefs about whether
player 2 has high or low costs can be derived using Bayes
rule as shown in the appendix. The mediator’s posterior
beliefsgiventhatshereceivedthemessageH areillustrated
in the middle of Figure 2. Her confidence that player 2
has high costs has increased, (the high cost bar is taller)
andherbeliefthatplayer2haslowcostshasdeclined.Her
newbeliefthatplayer2hashighcostsisdenotedhH.Con-
versely,ifthemediatorreceivestheLsignal,herbeliefsare
the decision maker by actually influencing the decision. Decision
makers prefer biased advisors in this set up because if the advisor
says something against his known bias, it is highly informative. In
myset-up,incontrast,playerspreferbiasedmediatorsbecauseonly
biased mediators are honest.WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 603
FIGURE2 The Bargaining Space and Distribution of
Reservation Values
as shown in the bottom of Figure 2. Her confidence that
player 2 has low costs has increased; her belief that player
2hashighcostshasgonedown.Hernewbeliefthatplayer
2 has high costs is hL. The posterior belief that player 2
hashighcostsafterreceivingthehighsignal,hH,isgreater
than the prior belief, h, which is in turn greater than the
posterior belief after receiving the low signal, hL, that is,
hH > h > hL.14
14In Figure 2, the parameter values are p = 0.4, s = 0.6, k = 0.4,
and   = 0.4, so that h = 0.5, hH = 0.6, and hL = 0.4.
Iassumethatthepartiesarenotinformedaboutwhat
signal the mediator received and hence do not know for
certain what the mediator’s beliefs are. Thus after Nature
moves, player 2 is informed of her type, player 1 is not,
the mediator has some additional information that she
can share with player 1, but the players are not sure what
this information is.
In order to understand the intuition behind the re-
sults,itwillhelptothinkabouthowtheequilibriumoffer
made by player 1 depends on her beliefs and how this
influences the likelihood of conflict. The likelihood of604 ANDREW KYDD
FIGURE3 The Equilibrium Offer
conflict will in turn influence the mediator’s incentive to
be truthful.
The Equilibrium Offer
If player 1 knew player 2’s type, she would make no con-
cessiontoahigh-costtype(offer y =1−s),andjustbuy
off alow-costtype(offer y =1− p −c2).Inneithercase
would conflict occur. Thus with complete information,
bargaining is successful, conflict does not occur, and so
there is no need for a mediator.
With uncertainty about player 2’s cost of fighting,
things are different. The equilibrium offer is illustrated
in Figure 3. The horizontal axis is the upper bound on
thedistributionof player2’scostforfighting,k.Thusthis
dimension can be thought of as a measure of how likely
player 2 is to have high costs, ex ante. The greater k is, the
morelikelyplayer2istohavehighcosts,andbeunwilling
to fight. The smaller k is, the greater the likelihood that
player2haslowcosts,andwillfightifnotboughtoff.The
vertical axis is the equilibrium offer from player 1, y.
First, consider the case where player 1 is operating
with her prior beliefs, perhaps because the mediator is
untrustworthy or is not conveying any information. This
case is represented by the middle of the three downward
sloping lines. For very low values of k, player 1 thinks
player 2 is very likely to be dissatisfied, and so player 1
makesthemaximumconcessionwhichsufficestobuyoff
all types of player 2. This offer is y = 1 − p, or 0.6 in the
example used so far. As the likelihood that player 2 has
high costs goes over a certain threshold, denoted A and
derived in the appendix, player 1 starts making a smaller
offer. Player 1’s offer declines the more likely player 2 is
tohavehighcosts,untilasecondthreshold,B,isr eac hed,
at which it reaches a minimum. For k greater than B,
player 1 thinks player 2 is very likely to have high costs
and be unwilling to fight. Player 1 therefore makes no
concession at all, proposing that the status quo remain in
place, offering y = 1 − s, or 0.4.
Nowconsiderthecasewhereplayer1hasreceivedthe
H signal from the mediator and believed it, as illustrated
in the left-most line. Since player 1 has become more
convinced that player 2 has high costs, and will not fight,
she decides to make a smaller offer in equilibrium. This
hastheeffectofshiftingthecurvetotheleft.Player1stops
making a full concession earlier at AH (which is less than
A), and her offer decreases more quickly, until player 1 is
so confident that she is facing a weak type that she makes
no concession at all, when k > BH.
Finally, on the right is the case where player 1 has
received the L signal and believes it. Player 1 is now more
convinced that player 2 has low costs and will fight. This
makesplayer1moregenerouswithheroffer,whichshifts
the curve to the right. Player 1 must be more convinced
that player 2 has high costs before she will stop making a
fullconcession,at AL,andmustbeveryconvincedbefore
insisting on the status quo at BL.
The essential point is that if player 1 receives the H
message from the mediator and believes it, she will make
a smaller offer to player 2 than she would if she received
theL messageandbelievedit.15 Totellplayer1thatplayer
15Note,forextremevaluesof thepriorbeliefs—attheleftandright
hand side of Figure 3—no information from the mediator can
change player 1’s course of action. On the left, she is so convinced
that player 2 is tough that she will make a full concession even if
the mediator tells her player 2 is weak, and on the right she is so
convinced that player 2 is weak that she will make no concession
even if the mediator tells her he is resolved.WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 605
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2 is likely to have high costs, therefore, is to encourage
her to lower her offer. To tell her that player 2 has low
costs is to encourage her to raise her offer. This fact has
ramifications for the likelihood of bargaining failure and
conflict.
The Likelihood of Conﬂict
Ifthemediatoriscredible,player1willconditionheroffer
on what the mediator says. The size of her offer, in turn,
will influence the probability that negotiations will fail
and that conflict will ensue. Essentially, the smaller the
offer, the higher the probability of conflict. The smaller
the offer, the more low-cost types of player 2 will reject
it and decide to fight. For the mediator, therefore, to tell
player 1 that player 2 has high costs is to increase the
likelihood of conflict.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4. The hori-
zontal axis is the same as in Figure 3, the upper bound on
the prior distribution of player 2’s costs, k. The vertical
axis is the probability of bargaining failure and conflict.
The figure takes the perspective of a mediator who has
received the H signal from Nature, so is more persuaded
thatplayer2hashighcostsandwillnotfight.Themedia-
tor can now either communicate this to Player 1, causing
her to make a lower offer, or lie and say she got the L
signal, causing her to make a higher one.
The top curve, starting at AH, is the probability of
conflict if the mediator truthfully sends the H signal. It
rises as player 1’s offer declines, until it reaches a maxi-
mum at BH whereplayer1’sofferreachesitsminimumat
y =1−s.Fromthenonitdeclinesask increases,reflect-
ingthefactthatplayer2isgrowingincreasinglyunlikelyto
have low costs and be willing to fight. The bottom curve,
startingat AL,istheprobabilityofconflictifthemediator
lies instead, telling player 1 that she received the L signal
rather than the H signal. This increases until it intersects
the top curve, and then is identical to it, trailing off after
BL.
Thetopcurveiseverywhereabovethebottomcurve.
This means that, regardless of the prior likelihood that
player 2 has high costs, k, the likelihood of conflict is al-
ways higher if the mediator tells player 1 that player 2 has
high costs than it is if she says that player 2 has low costs.
If themediatorthinksplayer2doeshavehighcosts,being
truthful will increase the likelihood of conflict, whereas
lying will reduce it. For a mediator who wants, among
other things, to facilitate an agreement that reduces the
likelihood of conflict, this presents a troubling incentive
tolie.ItcaneasilybeshowninafiguresimilartoFigure4
thatifthemediatorreceivedtheLsignalandthinksplayer
2 is likely to have low costs, sending the L signal (in this
case truthfully) also reduces the likelihood of conflict. In
theend,regardlessof whatthemediatoractuallybelieves,
telling player 1 that player 2 has high costs increases the
chance of conflict, telling her that player 2 has low costs
will reduce it. This has crucial implications for the medi-
ator’s incentives to be truthful.
The Credibility of the Mediator
For a mediator to be credible, it must be the case that
she has an incentive to tell the truth. Assume that player
1 believes the mediator honestly announces whether she
received the H or L signal, and will act accordingly. The
mediator must then have an incentive to do just that,606 ANDREW KYDD
FIGURE5 The Credibility of the Mediator
communicate honestly about the signal. That is, if she
receives the H signal, she must have an incentive to re-
port this to player 1 rather than say she got the L signal,
and if she got the L signal, she must prefer to pass that
on rather than pretend she got the H signal. These two
conditions lead to constraints on the preferences the me-
diator can have if she is to be credible, constraints which
are illustrated in Figure 5. Recall that the mediator’s bias
is measured by  ,i f  is positive, the mediator is biased
in favor of player 1, if   is negative, the mediator is bi-
ased in favor of player 2, and if   is zero, the mediator is
unbiased.
If the mediator receives the low-costs signal, L, she
mustprefertotellplayer1this,ratherthanlieandpretend
she got the H signal instead. Being truthful in this case
causesplayer1tomakealargerofferthanshewouldhave
if the mediator had lied and sent the H signal, which de-
creasesthelikelihoodof conflict.Giventhatthemediator
suffers a cost if conflict occurs, this increases the media-
tor’spayoff.Thisconditionbasicallyputsanupperbound
onhowstronglythemediatorcanpreferhigher-issueres-
olutions,anupperboundon  denoted   .Anunbiased
mediatorwouldbehappytobetruthfulinthiscase,since
beingtruthfulleadstoalowerlikelihoodofconflict.Ifthe
mediator’s preferences are identical to player 1’s, if cm =
c1 and   = 1, she is also happy to be truthful. A mediator
would only wish to lie in this case if her preferences over
the issue were so strong that she would prefer that player
1 make no concession even if player 1, with the same in-
formation, would prefer to make one. To prefer to lie, the
mediator would have to be more royalist than the king.
Thus this constraint puts a (fairly high) upper bound on
howstronglythemediatorwantstominimizeconcessions
to player 2.
If the mediator receives the high costs signal, H,s h e
faces more of a dilemma. Telling the truth will encourage
player1tomakearelativelysmalloffer,whichwillprecip-
itateahigherchanceofconflict.Lyingwillconvinceplayer
1tomakealargerofferwhichismorelikelytobeaccepted.
Thusifthemediatorisunbiasedandsimplywantstomin-
imize the chance of conflict, she will face an insuperable
incentive to lie. Lying will make peace more likely; telling
thetruthwillmakeconflictmorelikely.Thustheunbiased
mediator faces a serious credibility problem. To have an
incentivetotellthetruthinthesecircumstances,themedi-
atormustbeatleastsomewhatbiasedinfavorof player1.
If themediatorprefersanissueresolutionassociatedwith
a smaller offer to that associated with a larger one (  is
positive), then she has an incentive to encourage player 1
tomakeasmallerofferifshethinksplayer2islikelytoac-
cept it. This policy preference outweighs the downside of
makingthesmalleroffer,theincreasedchanceofconflict.
Thus this constraint places a lower bound on how biased
in favor of player 1 the mediator can be in a truthtelling
equilibrium, a positive lower bound on   denoted   .
The upper and lower bounds on the mediator’s bias
are illustrated in Figure 5. The horizontal axis is once
againtheupperboundonthepriordistributionof playerWHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 607
2’s costs, k. The vertical axis is  , the mediator’s bias. The
lowercurveisthelowerbound,  ,andtheuppercurveis
the upper bound,    .16 Between the lines, a truth-telling
equilibrium is possible, above and below; only babbling
equilibriaexist.17Immediatelyapparentisthefactthatthe
mediator must be biased in favor of player 1 to have the
proper incentives to tell the truth regardless of the signal
she has received.
Empirical Implications
Themodelshowsthattheeffectof mediationistoreduce
the likelihood of conflict and encourage states to make
concessions. Dixon (1996), in a study of 640 postwar in-
terstate disputes, supports this implication and finds that
mediation and communication are associated with pre-
venting escalation and promoting peaceful resolution of
conflicts. Walter, in a study of civil wars, finds that “gov-
ernments and rebels are 39% more likely to bargain suc-
cessfully with the help of a mediator than on their own”
(Walter 2002, 82).18
Beyond this, the main empirical implication of the
model can be stated as follows.
Hypothesis 1 Mediators who attempt to persuade one side
to make a concession because the other side has high resolve
must be biased in favor of the side they are communicating
with in order to be successful.
Supportingthishypothesis,inarecentstudyofthird-
party interventions, Regan finds that neutral interven-
tions are associated with longer conflicts than biased in-
terventions (Regan 2002).
In addition, the model implies that biased mediators
succeedbygettingthesidetowardwhichtheyarebiasedto
makeconcessions.Thissuggeststhefollowinghypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Within the sample of successful mediation
efforts, in the cases in which the mediator is biased toward
oneoftheparties,thatpartywillmakealargerconcessionin
16The parameters are the same as before, with the addition of cm =
0.3 and c1 = 0.3.
17Inbabblingequilibriathesendersendsamessageatrandom,and
the receiver consequently receives no information and does not
condition her behavior on the signal. Babbling equilibria are also
possible between the lines, and for values of k below AH and above
BL. In cheap-talk games, babbling equilibria are always possible,
the question of interest is under what conditions truthful commu-
nication is possible.
18Mostquantitativestudiestakeitforgrantedthatmediationworks
andfocusonwhatfeaturesofthemediatorordisputemakeformore
or less successful mediation, i.e., Bercovitch and Langley (1996),
Bercovitch and Houston (1993).
the negotiation in comparison with what the average party
does in cases in which the mediator is unbiased.
This hypothesis has been tested by Gelpi on a dataset
of mediation efforts by state leaders in crises between
1918and1988(basedontheInternationalCrisisBehavior
dataset).Gelpistudiestheeffectofassymetricallianceties
on mediation. Building on the work of institutionalist
scholars, he argues that mediators which have alliance
ties to one side act to constrain that side, and get them to
make a concession. Alliances, that is, act as instruments
of control as well as signaling devices toward adversaries.
Heteststhehypothesisthatanalliancetietothemediator
shouldmakethechallengerdoworseinacrisisandfindsit
to be statistically significant and substantively important
(Gelpi 1999, 136–7).19
A final implication of the model has to do with why
good mediators are rare. The effective mediator in the
modelisonewhoisbiasedtowardoneside,buthasinfor-
mationtocontributeabouttheotherside,thesideagainst
whom she is biased. It may be the case that the more bi-
ased you are in favor of one side’s position, the less new
information you have to contribute about the other side.
Haig, for instance, had better judgment about whether
the British would fight over the Falklands due to his long
associationwithBritishofficials,butthislongassociation
undoubtedly also contributed to his bias in their favor,
making him useless to the Argentines as a mediator. In
some cases it may be difficult to find the requisite media-
tor who has enough exposure to the other side to acquire
new information, yet not so much as to come to share
their preferences, and hence lose their usefulness.
Conclusion
Mediation can indeed be useful in bargaining situations.
Byprovidinginformationabouttheresolveoftheparties,
mediatorscanreducethelikelihoodof conflict.However,
paradoxically, in order to be believed when they attempt
toprovidethisinformation,mediatorsmustbebiased.An
unbiased mediator who simply wants to prevent conflict
will not be credible to the parties invovled in the negoti-
ations because she could not be trusted to send messages
thatmightincreasethelikelihoodofconflict.Ifshecannot
betrustedtosendmessagesthatincreasethelikelihoodof
conflict, she cannot be trusted when she sends messages
that decrease it either, and hence she will have no credi-
bility. Only a biased mediator that shares the preferences
19Admittedly, many of the mediators in Gelpi’s sample are great
powers who may be using carrots and sticks to influence their al-
liance partners, a different mechanism from that considered here.608 ANDREW KYDD
of oneof thepartiesinthenegotiationswillbecrediblein
this context. This finding supports the arguments of me-
diation scholars such as Touval and Zartman who have
long held that neutrality is not a necessary attribute of
a successful mediator. However, the model develops the
idea further in two important ways. First, it shows that a
certain degree of bias is not only acceptable but is actu-
ally necessary for some roles that mediators play. Second,
it demonstrates this result for a role, information provi-
sion, that some scholars have argued properly belongs to
“neutral” weak mediators rather than powerful, and po-
tentially biased, mediators. This result should lead us to
reevaluate the theoretical underpinnings of this conven-
tional distinction in the literature.
Appendix
The mediator’s belief after receiving the signal that
player 2 has high costs is, from Bayes rule, hH =
(1− )h
(1− )h + (1−h), substituting in h =
p +k −s
k this becomes
hH =
(1− )(p +k −s)
(1− )(p +k −s)+ (s − p). After receiving the signal
that player 2 has low costs, the mediator’s beliefs are
hL =  h
 h +(1− )(1−h) or hL =
 (p +k −s)
 (p +k −s)+(1− )(s − p).
The solution concept I employ is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
I restrict attention to offers x ∈ [p, s]. Player 1 can
buyoff alltypesof player2byoffering x = p,soalloffers
x < p are dominated by x = p. Similarly, any offer x > s
wouldberejectedinatriviallymorecomplicatedgamein
which player 2 could reject an offer but not attack, since
player1hasnocrediblethreattofight.Sointerestingoffers
are located between p and s.
High-cost types of player 2 will accept any offer x ≤
s. Low-cost types will accept the offer if x ≤ p + c2, and
fight if x > p + c2.
Firstconsiderthecasewhereplayer1operatesonthe
basis of prior beliefs. The payoff for offering x ∈ [p, s]i s
the likelihood of acceptance times the value of the offer,
plus the likelihood of rejection times the value of war,
(h + (s − x)1−h
s − p)x + (1 − (h + (s − x)1−h
s − p))(p − c1).
For the maximum concession, x = p, this reduces to just
p, because all types of player 2 will accept the offer. For
the minimum concession, x = s, this reduces to hs +
(1 − h)(p − c1) which could be greater or less than p
depending on the prior beliefs.
The payoff could have a maximum at x = p, x = s,
or some interior point. To find possible interior max-
ima, we can set the derivative equal to zero, h + 1−h
s − ps −
1−h
s − p2x + 1−h
s − p(p −c1) = 0 and solve for x which gives
x0 =
h
1−h(s − p)+s + p −c1
2 or x0 = p +
k −c1
2 .
Bycomparingthiswiththepayoffsfornoconcession
andafullconcession,wecandeterminetwocutoff values
fork.Fork < A,player1makesthefullconcession,x = p.
For k ∈ (A, B), player 1 makes the interior offer, and for
k > B player 1 offers the status quo where, A ≡ c1 and
B ≡ 2(s − p) + c1.
The likelihood of war for a maximal concession, x =
p,i sz e r o .A sk increases and the offer decreases, the
likelihood of war as a function of the offer is (1−(h +
(s −x)1−h
s − p)). Substituting in the equilibrium offer, we
can find the likelihood of war as a function of player 2’s
maximum cost (1−(h +(s −(p +
k −c1
2 ))1−h
s − p)) which
reduces to 1
2 −
c1
2
1
k. Once the offer declines to s, the like-
lihood of war is just 1 − h or
s − p
k .
Now consider the case where player 1 has received
and believed the H signal. The payoff for an offer
x is (hH +(s −x)
1−hH
s − p )x +(1−(hH +(s −x)
1−hH
s − p ))
(p −c1).Onceagainwiththemaximumconcession, x =
p, all types of player 2 will accept so this reduces to p.F o r
noconcession, x =s,thisreducestohHs +(1−hH)(p −
c1)which,giventhathH >h,isbetterthanintheprevious
case.
The interior solution is found by taking the deriva-
tiveandsettingitequaltozero,hH +
1−hH
s − p s −
1−hH
s − p 2x +
1−hH
s − p (p −c1) = 0andsolvingforx,whichgives x(H) =
hH
1−hH (s − p)+s + p −c1
2 or x(H) =
1− 
  (p +k −s)+s + p −c1
2 .
Note that if   = 0.5, that is the signal is uninformative,
this reduces to the previous case based on the priors. As
  decreases from 0.5, the signal grows more informative,
the equilibrium concession decreases.
The boundaries for the interior offer in this
case are AH ≡ s − p +  
1− (p −s +c1), and BH ≡ s −
p +  
1− (s − p +c1). These also reduce to the former
case when the signal is uninformative, and decrease as
the signal accuracy improves.
The likelihood of war for interior offers is
(1−(hH +(s −x(H))
1−hH
s − p )) which reduces to 1
2 −
c1
2
 
(1− )(p +k −s)+ (s − p). If the signal is inaccurate this is
equivalent to the previous case, and as the signal gets
more accurate, the likelihood of war increases, which
is a result of the smaller offer because player 1 grows
more convinced that player 2 has high costs and will not
fight. If the mediator lies, and sends the L signal instead,
theprobabilityof waris(1−(hH +(s −x(L))
1−hH
s − p ))or
1
2
 2
1− (p +k −s)+ (s − p −c1)
(1− )(p +k −s)+ (s − p) . These two probabilities of war
are illustrated in Figure 4.
Now consider the case where player 1 has received
and believed the L signal. Here the payoff for making of-
ferx is(hL +(s −x)
1−hL
s − p )x +(1−(hL +(s −x)
1−hL
s − p ))
(p −c1). Once again, the maximum concession, x = p,WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 609
will be accepted for sure, yeilding p, while the minimum
concession, x =s,willgivehLs +(1−hL)(p −c1)which
isworsethanintheprevioustwocases.Theinteriorsolu-
tion is found by differentiating and setting equal to zero,
hL +
1−hL
s − p s −
1−hL
s − p 2x +
1−hL
s − p (p −c1) = 0, and solving
for x, producing x(L) =
hL
1−hL (s − p)+s + p −c1
2 or x(L) =
 
1− (p +k −s)+s + p −c1
2 .Theboundariesfortheinteriorof-
fer in this case are AL ≡ s − p + 1− 
  (p −s +c1), and
BL ≡ s − p + 1− 
  (s − p +c1).
Now consider the mediator’s decision about what to
say.
For k < AH even if player 1 has beliefs hH, she will
make the maximum offer, p,w h i c hw i l lb ea c c e p t e df o r
sure. Therefore the mediator’s communication can have
noimpactonplayer1’sbehavior,andhence,onthemedi-
ator’s payoff, which will be  p regardless of her commu-
nication.Sincethemediatorisindifferentbetweentelling
thetruthandlying,bothtruth-tellingandbabblingequi-
libria will exist.
For k ∈ [AH,min{AL, BH}], if player 1 receives the
L signal and believes it, she will make the maximal offer,
p,whichwillbeacceptedforsure,whileif shereceivesthe
H signal and believes it, she will make an interior offer,
x(H), which may be rejected or accepted.
First consider the case where the mediator has
received the H signal. If the mediator credibly commu-
nicates this to player 1, player 1 will offer x(H) which
will yield a payoff for the mediator of (hH +(s −x(H))
1−hH
s − p ) x(H)+(1−(hH +(s −x(H))
1−hH
s − p ))( p −cm)
while lying will convince player 1 to offer only p, leading
t oap a y o f fo f p for the mediator. Telling the truth beats
lying if   >    ≡
cm
1
2
1− 
  (p +k −s)+ 1
2(s − p +c1).
Now consider the case in which the mediator re-
ceives the L signal. To convey this to player 1 and be be-
lieved would yield a payoff of  p, since war is avoided
for sure. To lie and send the H message, would cause
player 1 to offer x(H), giving a payoff for the me-
diator of (hL +(s −x(H))
1−hL
s − p ) x(H)+(1−(hL +
(s −x(H))
1−hL
s − p ))( p −cm).Thustellingthetruthbeats
lyingif  <     ≡
cm
(  
1−  − 1
2
1− 
  )(p +k −s)+ 1
2(s − p +c1).Itcan
be shown that for   ∈ {0, 0.5}, that is for informative
signals, 0 <    <    . For a truth-telling equilibrium to
exist,themediatormustbebiasedinfavorofplayer1, ∈
[  ,    ].
For k ∈ [AL, BH], if player 1 receives the L signal
and believes it she will offer x(L), whereas if she
receives the H signal and believes it she will shift to
x(H). If the mediator receives the H signal, and con-
veysthistoplayer1andisbelieved,themediator’spayoffis
(hH +(s −x(H))
1−hH
s − p ) x(H)+(1−(hH +(s −x(H))
1−hH
s − p ))( p −cm). If the mediator lies and sends the
L signal, the payoff will be (hH +(s −x(L))
1−hH
s − p )
 x(L) + (1 − (hH + (s − x(L))
1−hH
s−p ))( p − cm). Tell-
ing the truth beats lying if   is greater than    ≡
cm
1
2( 1− 
  −  
1− )(p +k −s)+c1. If the mediator receives the
L signal, and conveys this to player 1, the payoff
to the mediator is (hL +(s −x(L))
1−hL
s − p ) x(L)+
(1−(hL +(s −x(L))
1−hL
s − p ))( p −cm). Lying by send-
ing the H signal instead produces a payoff for the
mediator equal to (hL +(s −x(H))
1−hL
s − p ) x(H)+
(1−(hL +(s −x(H))
1−hL
s − p ))( p −cm). Telling the
truth beats lying if   <     ≡
cm
1
2(  
1−  − 1− 
  )(p +k −s)+c1.
For k ∈ [BH, AL], if player 1 believes the H signal,
she will offer the status quo, s, and if she receives the L
signal she will only offer p. If the mediator receives the H
signal and conveys this to player 1, the payoff is hH s +
(1−hH)( p−cm).Ifthemediatorliesinstead,thepayoff
is just  p because war is avoided. Telling the truth beats
lying if   >    ≡
cm
1− 
  (p +k −s). If the mediator receives
the L signal and conveys it to player 1, the payoff is  p.
If the mediator lies instead, the payoff is hL s + (1 −
hL)( p − cm). Telling the truth beats lying if   <     ≡
cm
 
1− (p +k −s).
For k ∈ [ max{AL, BH}, BL], if player 1 believes the
L signal, she will offer x(L), and if she believes the H
signal, she will make the minimal offer, s. If the mediator
receives the H signal and credibly communicates it to
player 1 her payoff is hH s + (1 − hH)(  p − cm). If
she lies and sends the L signal instead, the payoff will be
(hH +(s −x(L))
1−hH
s − p ) x(L)+(1−(hH +(s −x(L))
1−hH
s − p ))( p −cm). Telling the truth beats lying if   is
greater than    ≡
cm
( 1− 
  − 1
2
 
1− )(p +k −s)+ 1
2(p −s +c1). If the
mediator receives the L signal and communicates this to
player 1, her payoff is (hL +(s −x(L))
1−hL
s − p ) x(L)+
(1−(hL +(s −x(L))
1−hL
s − p ))( p −cm) whereas lying
by sending the H signal would yield hL  s + (1 −
hL)(  p − cm). Telling the truth beats lying if   <     ≡
cm
1
2
 
1− (p +k −s)+ 1
2(p −s +c1).
For k > BL, regardless of player 1’s beliefs, she will
make the minimal offer, s,w h i c hw i l lp r o d u c eap a y o f f
for the mediator of h (s) + (1 − h)(p (1) − cm). Since
the mediator’s communication cannot affect her payoff,
there will be truth-telling and babbling equilibria.
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